The State of Utah v. Blaine D. Casper : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2002
The State of Utah v. Blaine D. Casper : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James C. Bradshaw; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorney for Appellant.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Casper, No. 20556.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2031
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ?/>&>& : 
l i O u i v u t . : 
Plaint iff-Respondent 
v. : 
BLAINE D. CASPER, : Case No. 20556 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a conviction and judgment for Aggravated 
Burglary, a Felony of the First Degree, and Aggravated Assault, a 
Felony of the Third Degree, in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. 
Banks, Judge, presiding. 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. : 
BLAINE D. CASPER, : Case No. 20556 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a conviction and judgment for Aggravated 
Burglary, a Felony of the First Degree, and Aggravated Assault, a 
Felony of the Third Degree, in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. 
Banks, Judge, presiding. 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT 
FAILURE TO MOVE THE DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY 
HEARING OUTSIDE THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT DENIED 
HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL 
MAGISTRATE 3 
CONCLUSION 8 
ADDENDUM A 10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE-OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725 (Wyo. 1979) 7 
Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520 (Utah 1948) . . . .4, 5, 8 
State v. Brown, 602 P.2d 478 (Ariz. 1979) . . 3 
State v. Byington, 200 P.2d 723 (Utah 1948) . . . . 5, 7, 8 
State v. Foy, 607 P.2d 481 (Kansas 1980) . 5 
State v. Hendrix, 363 P.2d 522 (Kansas 1961) 5 
State ex. rel. Mitchell v. Sage Stores Co., 143 P.2d 652 
(Kansas 1943) 5 
Yorta v. Okumoto, 643 P.2d 820 (Hawaii 1982) 6 
STATUTES CITED 
Constitution of State of Utah, Article VIII, Section 13 . 3 
Hawaii Rev. Stat. §601-7(b) (1980) 6 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953 as amended) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1953 as amended) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-29 (1953 as amended) 4 
-ii-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
(1) Did the trial court err in refusing to remand for a 
new preliminary hearing to be heard by a judge not sitting within 
the Fifth Circuit Court. 
-iii-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. : 
BLAINE D. CASPER, : Case No. 20556 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Darrell Blaine Casper, [hereinafter 
referred to as the defendant] appeals from a conviction and 
judgment imposed for Aggravated Burglary, a felony of the first 
degree pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1953 as amended); and 
for Aggravated Assault, a Felony of the Third Degree, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953 as amended) in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 10, 1984, the defendant went to the home of 
his former girlfriend, Connie Jo Ungricht [hereinafter referred to 
as the victim] to discuss the possibility of continuing their 
relationship. Upon being refused entry, the defendant, who had 
been drinking (T. 4) broke down a door and entered the home (R. 
26-28). 
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{ 
An argument ensued, with the defendant repeatedly 
indicating he wished them to marry and move to Montana (T. 9). 
The victim's rejection, when combined with the defendant's upset 
emotional state, caused the defendant to unintentionally strike 
her with a single blow to the abdomen, using the butt of a rifle. 
At no time did the defendant aim the rifle at the victim and no 
shots were fired (T. 3-4). 
The defendant subsequently remained with the victim and 
her young son for several hours. Concerned about the medical 
condition of the victim, the defendant drove her and her son to a 
local hospital for treatment (T. 9). 
On December 13, 1984, Judge Grant transferred the 
defendant's file from Salt Lake City to West Valley for a 
preliminary hearing (T. 46, R. 4). The basis of the transferral 
was that the victim was a long-time employee of the Fifth Circuit 
Court and in court on a daily basis (T. 41). In addition, the 
victim was known personally by the prosecutor (T. 41). 
On January 8, 1985, a preliminary hearing was conducted 
before Judge Tyrone Medley (T. 62, R. 4). Counsel for the 
defendant subsequently moved the District Court to remand for a 
new preliminary hearing (R. 41) (Addendum A). The basis of the 
motion was bias since the hearing was conducted before a judge of 
the same circuit in which the victim was employed (T. 44). The 
motion was denied (T. 64). 
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The defendant subsequently entered pleas of guilty as to 
Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated Assault in exchange for the 
dismissal of the kidnapping counts (T. 65). The defendant was 
sentenced five years to life for Aggravated Burglary and zero to 
five years for Aggravated Assault (T. 166), with the sentences 
running concurrently (T. 164). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant submits that the court erred in refusing to 
remand the case for a new preliminary hearing before a judge not 
sitting on a Fifth Circuit bench. The bias associated with the 
hearing violated the defendant's right to a fair trial before an 
impartial magistrate. 
ARGUMENT 
FAILURE TO MOVE THE DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY 
HEARING OUTSIDE THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT DENIED 
HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL 
MAGISTRATE. 
The right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial is the 
"foundation stone upon which our present judicial system rests." 
State v. Brown, 602 P.2d 478, 480 (Arizona 1979). This 
indespensible right to a trial presided over by a judge who is 
impartial and free of bias or prejudice is protected by the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article VIII, Section 13, which 
states that: 
"Except by consent of all the parties, no judge of the 
Supreme or inferior courts shall preside in a trial of 
any cause where either of the parties shall be connected 
with him by affinity or consanguinity within the degree 
of first cousin, or in which he may have been of counsel, 
or in the trial of which he may have presided in any 
inferior court. 
-3-
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( 
As a further protection of a defendant's right to a fair 
trial, Utah Code Ann. §77-35-29 (1953 as amended), provides that: 
If the prosecution or a defendant in any criminal action 
or proceeding shall file an affidavit that the judge 
before whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or 
heard has a bias or prejudice, either against such party 
or his attorney or in favor of any opposing party to the 
suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein until 
the challenge is disposed of. 
The general practice in the State of Utah has been for 
judges to disqualify themselves whenever an affidavit of bias and 
prejudice against them has been filed Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 
520, 523 (Utah 1948). The Supreme Court has noted that such a 
disqualification is commendable since, "the purity and integrity 
of the judicial process ought to be protected against any taint of 
suspicion to the end that the public and litigants may have the 
highest confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts." 
Id. While the mere filing of an affidavit of bias and prejudice 
does not disqualify a judge, this Court has concluded that, 
n
. . . it is ordinarily better for a judge to disqualify 
himself even though he may be entirely free of bias and 
prejudice . . . . (since) next in importance to the duty 
of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in 
such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness 
or integrity of the judge." Id. 
At the trial below, the defendant submitted an affidavit 
requesting that the trial court remand the cause for a new 
preliminary hearing before a Circuit Court Judge other than one 
from the Fifth Circuit. The basis of the motion was that the 
victim was an employee of the Circuit Court and well known to the 
-4-
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other employees of the Court (R. 41-42). The trial judge denied 
the motion and the defendant claims error. 
The rule generally followed throughout the United States 
is that the words "bias" and "prejudice" refer to the mental 
attitude or disposition of the judge toward a party to the 
litigation, and not to any views that he might entertain regarding 
the subject matter involved. State v. Foy, 607 P.2d 481 (Kansas 
1980). "Bias" and "Prejudice" mean a hostile feeling or spirit of 
ill will against one of the litigants, or undue friendship or 
favoritism toward one. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Sage Stores Co., 
143 P.2d 652, 655 (Kansas 1943). Thus, in determining whether or 
not a trial judge should be disqualified is not a question of 
"whether the trial judge believes the accused guilty, but whether 
the trial judge can give him (the defendant) a fair trial." State 
v. Hendrix, 363 P.2d 522, 523 (Kansas 1961); see also, Haslam v. 
Morrison, supra at 523, State v. Byington, 200 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1948). 
In the present case, there is clearly a possibility for 
bias among all the judges of the Fifth Circuit. The victim, as an 
employee of the Fifth Circuit, was in court on a daily basis. In 
addition, the victim was a friend of the prosecutor (T. 43-44) and 
the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association refused to represent the 
defendant because of familiarity with the victim (T. 45-46). 
In Haslam v. Morrison, supra, this Court discussed the 
degree of bias or prejudice necessary to disqualify a judge from 
-5-
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hearing a case. After noting the importance of a fair trial the 
Court cautioned that 
"even if the judge concludes that the affiant is sincere 
in his belief that he, the judge, is biased against him, 
it ordinarily is well for such judge not to try the case 
for the. very reason that he may unconsciously lean toward 
such litigant to demonstrate that he is not biased toward 
him. And unless the judge is entirely insensitive to 
criticism and a revealed state of a litigant's mind, he 
may be rendering his judgment from a mind not entirely 
free from emotion." Id., at 524. 
The trial court indicated concern for the timeliness of 
the filing of the motion (T. 48-49). While the motion for remand 
was submitted after the preliminary hearing, the reason was a 
mistake on the part of the trial attorney who believed the hearing 
was outside the Fifth Circuit (T. 46-47). Such an error should 
not prejudice the defendant when such an important right is at 
stake. 
Hawaii wisely allows an appeal such as in the present 
case when the defendant shows good cause. Hawaii Revised Stat. 
§601-7(b) (1980), requires that a judge shall be disqualified when 
a sufficient affidavit is filed before a hearing is held and, if 
not, when cause shall be shown. Yorta v. Okumoto, 643 P.2d 820, 
824 (Hawaii 1982) . 
It is important to note that the transfer of the preliminary 
hearing by the prosecutor indicates, at a minimum, that there 
existed a possibility of unfairness with regard to the defendant 
since the victim was a court employee. 
-6-
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Clearly, a mistake by an attorney as to potential 
prejudice should not thereby prevent a subsequent appeal when the 
issue is the fairness of the trial itself. As this Court has 
noted, "The purity and integrity of the judicial process ought to 
be protected against any taint of suspicion to the end that the 
public and litigants may have the highest confidence in the 
integrity and fairness of the courts. (Emphasis added) State v. 
Byingtony supra at 726. 
In the present case, the defendant was clearly prejudiced 
as a result of bias by the magistrate. The facts of the case, the 
breaking and entering with intent to commit an assault, indicate 
the defendant had no intention of committing a burglary (T. 8-10). 
Yet, the third degree assault was used to bootstrap three other 
charges, one for burglary and two for aggravated kidnapping (T. 
11, R. 26-28), all of which are first degree felonies. 
Additionally, the transcript reveals that the charge of 
aggravated kidnapping with regard to the boy (Count IV) was bound 
over even though there was no testimony supporting the charge (T. 
48-49). Not only did the boy not testify, but all other testimony 
indicates the boy never even knew the assault on his mother was 
taking place (T. 49). 
Such a situation clearly indicates the defendant was not 
treated with fairness at the preliminary hearing. A similar 
situation existed in Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725 (Wyoming 1979). 
There the court considered the question of when suspected bias is 
sufficient to warrant a remand. They noted: 
-7-
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The "bias" which is a ground for disqualification of a 
judge must be personal, and it must be such a condition 
of mind which sways judgment and renders the judge unable
 { 
to exercise his functions impartially in a given case or 
which is inconsistent with a state of mind fully open to 
the conviction which evidence might produce. .Id. at 
729. 
After the charges were bound over to Third District Court 
defendant was left in the dubious position of going to trial on 
all charges, or entering into a plea arrangement and pursuing his 
appeal to this court. Given the lack of options defendant chose 
to enter the plea. That choice should in no way affect his 
petition to this court. The defendant's plea was entered after 
the error and was only a response to the unfair position directly 
caused by the magistrates bias. 
The binding over of all four counts when there was 
clearly insufficient information denied the defendant a fair 
trial. At a minimum, the circumstances create a "suspicion" of 
bias sufficient to reverse and remand under this Court's rulings 
in Byington and Haslam. 
CONCLUSION 
Darrell Blaine Casper requests this Court to reverse his f 
conviction and remand the cause for a new preliminary hearing 
before a magistrate not sitting as a judge from the Fifth Circuit. 
Since the victim is a well known employee of the Fifth Circuit, 
the remand is necessary to ensure the defendant of his right to a 
fair trial. 
Respectfully submitted this day of December, 1985. 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, JAMES C. BRADSHAW, hereby certify that four copies of 
the foregoing Appellant's Brief will be delivered to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this day of December, 1985. 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED by this day 
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ANDERSON St HOLLAND 
JOHN B. ANDERSON -7091 
Attorney for Defendant. 
62 3 East First South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 363-9345 
:OJ 
^/.Til^C^ 
IN THE THIRD J U D I C I A L DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BLAINE D. CASPER, 
• ) Defendant. 
MOTION TO REMAND 
C-rV~I-L NO. CIR.CRT.. 84FS2615 
t'A:JT- CJ^T 
JUDGE JAY S. BANKS 
\/:l ISS-S'^J 
COMES NOW, the Defendant by and through his attorney, 
JOHN 3. ANDERSON, and moves to remand this cause for a new 
preliminary hearing before a Circuit Court Judge other than the 
Fifth Circuit on the grounds that the victim, Connie Ungricht 
is employed as a secretary by the Fifth Circuit Court and the 
Judge who heard the preliminary hearing, the Honorable Tyrone 
Medley is a Judge of the Fifth Circuit and because of bias, the 
Defendant was denied a fair hearing under his constitutional 
rights to due process and equal protection. The Prosecutor 
recognized this bias by having the Preliminary Hearing, in the 
West Valley Division rather than the Salt Lake Division of the 
Fifth Circuit Court. Nonetheless the Judge hearing the cause 
is still a Judge of the Fifth Circuit. 
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)ATED t h i s " "'' day of F e b r u a r y , 1985 
... - ,-,n 7r 
' A 
JO',i/x ,3. ANDERSON 
Attcrnev for Defendant 
CEETIEICATE c? DELIVERY 
, 7 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e ''- ' - ' day of F e b r u a r y , 1985, 
t h e o r i g i n a l of t h e f o r e g o i n g Motion was d e l i v e r e d t o t h e C o u r t 
w i t h a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy 'hi\^c. d e l i v e r e d t o D a v i d W a l s h , 
Deputy County A t t o r n e y . 
/ / / / 
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